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PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Henry G. McMahon*
Two years ago the Louisiana State Law Institute, which had
spent more than a decade of continuous work in the redaction
of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, issued its statement
of policy' with respect to the continuous revision of the new
procedural code:
"In any revision of the law as comprehensive as the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure and its implementing legislation, it was inevitable that errors, hiatuses, and obscurities
would exist and come to light only in the years following
their adoption. Additionally, it is evident that procedural
rules designed to function in the light of existing social and
economic conditions might prove unworkable when these
conditions changed. For these reasons, at the time of the
submission of this procedural revision to the Legislature,
the continuous study and revision thereof in the future was
recognized as necessary by, and adopted as the future policy
of, the Law Institute."
This policy was put into effect immediately upon the adoption of the procedural revision, some five months before it went
into effect. The Reporters on the project invited professional
criticism, the pointing out of errors therein, and suggestions
for its improvement. As a result during the first year following the adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Reporters
received through correspondence, telephone calls, and personal
conversation hundreds of complaints and suggestions for changes
in the procedural rules. All of these were carefully considered.
In the vast majority of instances, these complaints and suggestions had no merit, and were due entirely to professional unfamiliarity with the provisions of the new code and its implementing legislation; and, in most instances, those offering the
complaints and suggestions were finally convinced of their lack
of merit.
*Boyd Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

1. Second Annual Report on the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure 1 (1962).
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However, a number of very constructive criticisms and sound
suggestions were received in this manner, leading the Reporters
to recommend to the Council of the Institute, in their First
Annual Report on the Code of Civil Procedure, the amendment
of a few code articles. As a result, the Council recommended
to the legislature, through the drafting of the bill which was
ultimately adopted as Act 23 of 1961, that sixteen articles be
amended and one new article added to the new procedural code.
These amendments corrected six errors and hiatuses in the code,
four of which were so serious as to produce considerable damage had they not been removed when they were. 2 Six code articles were amended solely for purposes of clarification ;8 two
were changed to accord with subsequent legislation ;4 and one
was amended to change a procedural rule which had been in
effect for some years prior to, and which had been retained in,
the new code.The following year the Reporters continued to receive
criticism and proposed changes from the Bench and Bar, but
in nothing like the volume of the preceding year. Lawyers and
judges had been studying the code and were becoming increasingly familiar with its provisions, with the result that complaints resulting from misunderstanding dropped off appreciably. Each objection and suggestion received by the Reporters
was studied carefully, and the meritorious ones submitted to
the Council for its consideration. As a result, the Council recommended to the legislature, through the draft of the bill which
was adopted as Act 92 of 1962, the amendment of nine articles
and the addition of five new ones. Of the nine code articles thus
amended, two removed hiatuses in the code which had been discovered during the preceding year;6 while six amendments
merely provided desirable clarification. 7 An amendment of one
2. The four serious errors and hiatuses were removed through the amendment
of LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

arts. 42, 1913, 1974, 3004, 3195, and 3307

(1960). Two less potentially dangerous hiatuses were removed through amendment of id. arts. 2121 and 4541.
3. Id. arts. 44, 1438, 2299, 2417, 4548, and 4922.
4. Id. arts. 3121 and 3122 were amended to conform to the amendment of
LA. R.S. 9:1581 through 9:1590 (1950) by La. Acts 1960, No. 497, creating the
office of public administrator of East Baton Rouge and Jefferson Parishes.
5. Id. art. 1352, placing witnesses who live or who are employed out of the
parish, but within twenty-five miles of the court, on the same basis as witnesses
residing or employed within the parish, insofar as witness fees and expenses are
concerned.
6. Id. arts. 74 and 4342.
7. Id. arts. 801, 1092, 2643, 3306, 4371, and 4554.
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article,8 and the five new articles added 9 represented procedural
growth to meet changing conditions more effectively. One other
article was amended by the legislature itself;1o and this only
after committee amendment to embody identical recommendations submitted by the Law Institute and the Judicial Council.
No recommendations concerning the new
were submitted to the legislature by the Law
1963, as nothing indicated the urgency of code
tifying a request for legislative action during a

procedural code
Institute during
amendment jusfiscal session.

A few proposed changes are now under consideration by the
Council of the Institute; and while this study will not be completed for several months, it is reasonably safe to predict that
the Institute will recommend the amendment of a few additional code articles at the 1964 legislative session.
Three years have now elapsed since the new procedural code
became effective, and during this period its provisions have been
subjected to the acid test of actual use in judicial crucibles. Two
matters of significance have occurred during this period. First,
gradually during this period the new code has won general professional acceptance, with an occasional caustic criticism emanating from some attorney seeking a scapegoat for the loss of
his case. Second, with but rare exceptions, the courts' application of the provisions of the new procedural code has indicated
both a complete understanding of its rules and a sympathy for
its objectives. A study of the procedural decisions of the appellate courts of Louisiana during the past term will demonstrate
this second point rather convincingly.
JURISDICTION

At the present time, the Achilles' heel of Louisiana civil
procedure is jurisdiction in personam over nonresident individuals and partnerships.". The Law Institute is presently working
8. Id. art. 2087.
9. Id. arts. 3291-3294, and 4643.
10. Id. art. 156 was amended by Acts 1962, No. 409, to permit a judge whose
recusal was sought, or who recused himself, on any ground other than an interest
in the case to appoint a lawyer domiciled in the judicial district having the
qualifications of a district judge to try the case.
11. On this point, see Jurisdiction Under the Louisiana Code of tapped
Civil Prothe
cedure, 35 TuL. L. REv. 501, 513 (1961). Louisiana, however, has
full potential of jurisdiction in personam over foreign corporations. Id. at 51013.
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on a proposed special statute to close in this hiatus, for submis2
sion to the 1964 legislative session.'
Figuratively speaking, this vulnerable heel was pierced by
the lance of the garnishee in Consolidated Credit Corp. v. Johnston.18 Seeking to enforce its judgment through garnishment
of the debtor's salary or commissions, the plaintiff garnished
the debtor's employer, an individual operating a used automobile
lot in Baton Rouge. The notice of seizure and garnishment
process were served on the garnishee's general manager (who
through a curious coincidence just happened to be the judgment
debtor himself), the garnishee not being present in the state at
the time. The garnishee promptly challenged the court's jurisdiction in personam over him, alleging and proving that he was
domiciled in Jackson, Mississippi. 1 4 The trial court overruled
this exception and rendered judgment against the garnishee,
ordering him to pay to the sheriff periodically the non-exempt
portion of the debtor's salary or commissions. The Court of
Appeal, First Circuit, reluctantly reversed this judgment on
appeal, and held that as the garnishee had not been served
personally, the trial court had no jurisdiction over him. Under
the present law, the decision of the appellate court is unquestionably correct. The silver lining to this cloud is that this unfortunate result will almost certainly be changed within the
year.
15
The judgment under supervisory review in Corley v. Rowan
was rendered prior to the effective date of the Code of Civil
Procedure, but the ruling of the appellate court would have been
the same if the case had been governed by the pertinent rule of
the new procedural code. 16 Three of the defendants sued in that
case first filed an exception of lis pendens; but through an ex
parte petition subsequently obtained an order striking the names
of two or these defendants from the exception on the ground

12. This proposed statute is an adaptation of the pertinent provisions of the
Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act.
13. 152 So. 2d 399 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
14. Under LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 42(5) and 2412 (1960), the
court would have had jurisdiction over the garnishee had he been served personally with the garnishment process. Unfortunately he was not. LA. R.S.
13:3471(1) (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1960, No. 32, § 1, afforded no help
in this case, since it applies only to foreign corporations.
15. 146 So. 2d 271 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
16. Cf. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 7 (1960). However, the hypertechnical requirement that a defendant challenge the personal jurisdiction of
the court first, and then plead alternatively his other declinatory and dilatory
objections has been eliminated by id. arts. 925 and 928.
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that, as to them, the exception had been filed in error. Plaintiff
subsequently ruled these defendants into court to show cause
why the order should not be annulled, but the trial court discharged her rule. Under supervisory writs, the Court of Appeal,
Second Circuit, held that the filing of the exception constituted
an appearance which submitted these two nonresidents to the
trial court's jurisdiction in personam; and that the court could
not be deprived of its personal jurisdiction over them through
any withdrawal of the exception.
VENUE
The pattern of the rules of jurisdiction ratione personae
adopted by the Code of Practice consisted of the general rule
of suit at the defendant's domicile in article 162, followed by
articles containing permissive and mandatory exceptions thereto.
The Louisiana decisions since 1940 interpreting these articles
had scrambled their rules with those governing jurisdiction
ratione materiae, by holding that those provisions of the Code
of Practice regulating jurisdiction ratione personae couched in
mandatory language were exclusive and could not be waived.
This led to a very considerable amount of confusion and uncertainty with respect to the rules providing the locus for the
institution of suit. Drastic surgery was required for the removal
of the judicial gloss which had accumulated over the code ar17
ticles regulating jurisdiction ratione personae.
On no section of the Code of Civil Procedure did the Law
Institute spend more time and devote more meticulous care than
on the articles governing venue. The redactors sought to eliminate confusion in the application of the rules of venue with those
governing jurisdiction by: (1) the deliberate use of "may" and
"shall" in the venue articles ;18 (2) adopting a rule of statutory
construction that the word "may" is to be interpreted as permissive, and "shall" as mandatory;19 and (3) providing a formula
to prevent any conflict when cases fell within the application
20
of two or more code provisions.
17. The subject is discussed in Jurisdiction Under the Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure, 35 TuL. L. REV. 501, 502 (1961) ; Note, 7 LA. L. REv. 437
(1947) ; and Note, 23 LA. L. REV. 779 (1963).
18. E.g., LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 41-45, 71-83 (1960).
19. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 5053 (1960). See also LA. R.S. 1:3
(1950), which voices the same rule.
20. LA. CODE OF CVILn PROCEDURE art. 45 (1960).

296

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIV

Gurtler, Hebert & Co. v. Marquette Cas. Co. 21 is a dour re-

minder of the validity of Robert Burns' famous observation
that "The best laid plans o' mice and men gang aft agley."
There, the plaintiff subcontractor sought to enforce his recorded
privilege at the domicile of the defendant rather than in the
parish where the immovable affected by the privilege was situated. The defendant excepted to the venue on the ground that
the action was one in rem and that the property was situated in
another parish. The trial court held the venue improper and
dismissed the suit. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that both
R.S. 9:4812 and article 72 of the Code of Civil Procedure provided the venue for the enforcement of the privilege, and that
both used the permissive "may," rather than the mandatory
"shall." Insurmountable obstacles to any acceptance of this
argument by the appellate court, at least insofar as it concerned
R.S. 9:4812, were a recent Supreme Court decision rejecting
this argument 22 and the obvious impossibility of construing
"may" as permissive with respect to both the venue and the
parish where the privilege might be recorded. In view of this,
the appellate court held that, to avoid any conflict between the
statutory and code provisions, the word "may" in the latter
should be construed as mandatory, rather than as permissive.
The judgment appealed from was affirmed.
There is little doubt that the result reached by the appellate
court was correct; but if the language and reasoning of the
appellate court is followed in subsequent cases, a very considerable amount of damage will be done to the venue articles in the
new procedural code. The appellate court should have reached
this result through the application of the jurisprudential rule
that when a special statute creates a substantive right and also
provides the venue for its enforcement, the venue so provided
23
is exclusive and the general rules of venue have no application.
Further, the court misinterpreted the language "The said privilege ...

may be enforced by a civil action in any court of com-

petent jurisdiction in the parish in which the land is situated"
of R.S. 9:4812.
"....

Although the statute uses the permissive word 'may,'

21. 145 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962), noted 33 LA. L. REV. 779
(1963).
22. Rathborne Lumber & Supply Co. v. Falgout, 218 La. 629, 50 So. 2d 295
(1950).
23. The pertinent statutes and cases are discussed in Note, 23 LA. L. REV.
779, 781 n17 (1963).
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it is submitted this is permissive only with reference to
plaintiff's choice of enforcing or not enforcing the privilege;
the legislature did not use the word 'shall' because this would
require judicial enforcement to perfect the privilege. The
word 'may,' therefore, modifies the substantive right and
not the venue. Consequently, if a plaintiff choose to enforce
the privilege, he must bring the action in the parish wherein
the land is located.
"On the other hand, Article 72 of the Code of Civil Procedure is specifically a venue provision and creates no substantive right. Hence the word 'may' modifies only the venue
and the venue is therefore optional unless otherwise provided
'24
by law.
Under article 165(9) of the Code of Practice, if the defendant did "anything for which an action for damage lies," a suit
to recover these damages could be brought in the parish where
the damage was done. This language was so broad that very
properly the Louisiana courts had consistently held that it in25
cluded an action to recover damages for breach of contract.
This rule proved difficult to apply in actual practice, so in the
redaction of the Code of Civil Procedure the counterpart of
this code provision was limited to an "action for the recovery of
'' 26
damages for an offense or quasi offense.
In Chronister v. Creole Corp.,27 plaintiff sued defendant to
enforce the return of a rental deposit and to recover damages
for his wrongful eviction from the leased premises prior to the
termination of the lease. This suit was brought in the parish
where the rented property was situated, but which was not
the domicile of the defendant. Accordingly, defendant excepted
to the venue. The trial court overruled this exception; and in
due course rendered judgment ordering the return of the rental
deposit and otherwise rejecting the plaintiff's demands. On
appeal, this judgment was affirmed. The Court of Appeal,
Fourth Circuit, held that the plaintiff's claim was ex contractu
in part (for the return of the deposit) and ex delicto in part
24. Note, 23 LA. L. REv. 779, 781 n16 (1963).
25. See cases cited in the Comment under LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art.
74 (1960).
26. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 74 (1960). This article was amended
by La. Acts 1962, No. 92, § 1, but only to extend the article to an action to enjoin
wrongful conduct.
27. 147 So. 2d 218 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
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(for damages for the wrongful eviction) ; and that consequently
the suit was properly brought in the parish where the defendant's wrongful conduct occurred.
Under the peculiar facts of the case, the appellate court's
decision was proper. However, the defendant might have successfully maintained its objection to the venue of the action ex
contractu had it also excepted to its cumulation with the action
ex delicto. A plaintiff may cumulate plural actions against the
same defendant only if each "of the actions cumulated . . .is
'2
brought in the proper venue.
ACTIONS
Abatement
Probably the most difficult of all intruders to expel from the
civil law of Louisiana has been the common law doctrine of
abatement and revival of actions, which the Livingston committee in the early nineteenth century did its best to exclude completely, 29 but which seeped into Louisiana law interstitially in
subsequent years.30 The hope of the Louisiana State Law Institute was to administer the coup de grace to this hypertechnical
doctrine through the new procedural code and its implementing
legislation. 3 '
Considerable justification for this hope was afforded by the
decisions of the appellate courts of Louisiana during the past
term. Only two cases, both of transitional importance only, were
decided in this area. 32 Both held that the 1960 amendment of
article 2315 of the Civil Code could not be given retroactive application.
Abandonment
In Tucker v. Tucker:3 the plaintiff wife obtained a judgment
of divorce which reserved the rights of the parties to a community settlement. Shortly thereafter an inventory of the com28. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 462(1) (1960).
29. Through LA. CODE OF PRACTICE arts. 21, 22, 25, 28, 33, and 40 (1825)
and LA. CIVIL CODE art. 939 (1825). On this subject, see Comment, Abatement
of Actions in Louisiana, 15 LA. L. REv. 722, 724 (1955).
30. Ibid.
31. Through LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 428 (1960) and LA. CIVIL
CODE art. 2315 (1870), as amended by La. Acts 1960, No. 30, § 1.
32. Blanks v. Chisesi, 142 So. 2d 45 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) and Gross v.
Hartline, 144 So. 2d 424 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
33. 150 So. 2d 665 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
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munity property was filed in the divorce proceeding, to which
the wife filed an opposition. This opposition was fixed for trial
and continued at various times. More than five years later, the
wife filed suit to partition the community property, and was met
with an exception of lis pendens based on the pendency of the
prior proceeding to partition. The trial court sustained this exception and dismissed the wife's suit; but on appeal this judgment was reversed. The Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, held
that the failure of the parties to take any prosecutive or defense
step in the first action to partition the community automatically
had resulted in its abandonment, 4 and hence it did not preclude
the plaintiff's subsequent suit for a partition.
PLEADING

The Petition
Since at least 1825 the rule in Louisiana has been that the
service of citation interrupts prescription;35 and more than
three decades ago this was broadened legislatively to include an
interruption by the filing of suit in a court of competent jurisdiction.3 6 Both rules were retained in consolidated form in the
legislation implementing the procedural code revision.3 7 One of
the difficult questions raised by these rules is whether the service of citation on, or the filing of suit against, a wrong defendant interrupts prescription against the proper defendant, when
the two are so closely associated, connected, or related as to warrant the inference that the proper defendant knew of the act interrupting prescription. To this question, the courts of Louisiana have been giving an increasingly liberal answer.38 There is
also a procedural facet to this problem as to whether, through
an amendment of the petition, the proper defendant may be substituted for the one sued erroneously. Under the regime of the
Code of Practice, there was considerable doubt whether such a
substitution could be made after the filing of an answer.3 9 Under
34. Under LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 561 (1960).
35. Under LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3484 (1825) ; and LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3518
(1870).
36. Through La. Acts 1932, No. 39, § 1, subsequently re-enacted as LA. R.S.
9:5801 (1950).
37. LA. R.S. 9:5801 (1950), as amended by Acts 1960, No. 31, § 1. See also
LA. CODE O CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 421 and 5251(4) (1960).
38. See Lunkin v. Triangle Farms, 208 La. 538, 23 So. 2d 209 (1945) ; Jackson v. American Employers Ins. Co., 202 La. 23, 11 So. 2d 225 (1942) ; Andrepont
v. Ochsner, 84 So. 2d 63 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1955). Cf. Martin v. Mud Supply
Co., 239 La. 616, 119 So. 2d 484 (1959).
39. See LA. CODE OF PRCTICE art. 419 (1870) and cases discussed in Mc-
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the new procedural code it seems clear that this substitution of
defendants can be effected through an amendment of the petition
allowed by the trial court, regardless of whether an answer has
40
been filed or not.
41
All facets of the problem were presented in Brooks v. Wiltz.

The plaintiff sued Elsworth G. Wiltz to recover damages for injuries resulting from a gunshot wound allegedly inflicted by the
defendant. Elsworth A. Wiltz filed an answer, denying generally the allegations of the petition. Sometime later plaintiff
amended her petition to substitute Ellis G. Wiltz as the defendant, in lieu of his twin brother, Elsworth A. Wiltz. Since more
than a year had elapsed between the shooting and the amendment of the petition, the substituted defendant excepted to the
amended petition on the ground of prescription. The trial court
sustained this exception and dismissed the suit; but on appeal
this judgment was reversed. The Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, held that since both brothers were represented by the same
attorneys, the service of citation on the original defendant was
sufficient to interrupt prescription against the substituted defendant.
Bertucci Bros. Const. Co. v. Succession of Mitchell42 presented an extremely important point concerning the amendment of
the petition. When the evidence presented by plaintiff proved a
right of action in one of its partners rather than in plaintiff
partnership, counsel for plaintiff asked for and obtained leave
of court to amend the petition'so as to conform to this proof by
dictating the amendment orally into the record. This oral
amendment met the instant objection of defendant, but it was
allowed by the trial court and judgment was rendered for plaintiff. On appeal, this judgment was reversed, and the case was
remanded for further proceedings. The Court of Appeal, Fourth
Circuit, held that any amendment of the petition must be in
writing and served on the defendant. Even though there is considerable doubt of the validity of the precedent relied on by the
appellate court,48 this oral amendment effected a substitution
LOUISIANA PRACTICE 43 et seq. (1956 Supp.)
40. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 1151 and 1153

MAHON,

Stewart v. Maloney Trucking and Storage, Inc., 147 So. 2d 62

(1960)

and

(La. App. 4th

Cir. 1962).
41. 144 So. 2d 413 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
42. 149 So. 2d 675 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
43. Caddo Parish School Board v. Pyle, 30 So. 2d 349 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1947) held that a trial court had no right to permit an oral amendment of the
petition during trial; and that any such amendment had to be in writing, filed
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of parties plaintiff and under the precise facts of the case the
appellate court's decision is sound. However, if the language of
this decision is extended further in future cases it may cause
considerable damage to our procedural rules.
Article 1154 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in part, provides
that:
... If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground
that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the
court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do
so freely when the presentation of the merits of the action
will be subserved thereby, and the objecting party fails to
satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would
prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense on the
merits. The court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence."
This rule does not fit the facts of this case, as the evidence
offered by plaintiff proved a right of action in some one other
than the plaintiff and counsel for defendant did not object to
the evidence for this reason. However, the efficacy of this code
rule is pitched on the assumption that the pleading may be
amended orally during the trial by dictating the amendment into
the record. Of course, if the objecting party is entitled to a continuance to enable him to meet this evidence, the trial court
should grant it. Otherwise, if the objecting party insists on his
pound of flesh, the trial court should grant a short recess to
have the amendment typed, filed, and served on counsel for the
objecting party while in court.
Exceptions
The more detailed rules governing the exceptions in the new
procedural code seem to be working more effectively than the
jurisprudential rules which they replaced. The past term failed
to yield the bountiful harvest of cases involving the exceptions
which prior terms invariably produced.
The opinion of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, in State v.
PreferredAccident Insurance Co. of N. y.,44 contains a very able
differentiation of the functions of the objection to procedural
and served on the opposing party. However, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to review this holding, and prior to argument the case became moot and was dismissed for this reason. Id. 212 La. 481, 32 So. 2d 897 (1947).
44. 149 So. 2d 632 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
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capacity and that of no right of action. There, a foreign corporation licensed to do business in Louisiana asserted several
subrogated claims against the ancillary receiver of an insolvent
foreign insurance company. All of these claims arose out of and
were connected with the business done in this state by the insurer. In the trial court the receiver moved to dismiss these
claims on the ground that, under the Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act,45 only a citizen of Louisiana could assert a claim
against funds in the hands of the ancillary receiver. This motion and other defenses were overruled by the trial court, which
rendered judgment in favor of the claimant. On appeal, inter
alia, the receiver's motion to dismiss was renewed. The claimant opposed it on the ground that the so-called motion to dismiss
was actually an objection to the procedural capacity of the
claimant which should have been asserted through the dilatory
exception filed prior to answer. The appellate court pointed out
that, since this motion challenged the claimant's right to recover
rather than its procedural capacity to sue, this motion was actually the objection of no right of action which could be asserted
at any time. However, this motion to dismiss was overruled on
the ground that a foreign corporation which qualifies to do business in Louisiana thereby acquires all of the rights of a domestic
corporation.
Evidence may be adduced on the trial of exceptions raising
certain of the procedural objections ;46 and this evidence may include the testimony of an adverse party taken under cross-examination.4 7 A question which has long remained unanswered is
whether an adverse party who is a nonresident may be compelled
to appear personally in court to be cross-examined. In Cattle
Farms, Inc. v. Abercrombie4 the trial judge refused to order a
nonresident defendant to appear for cross-examination at the
trial of the peremptory exception raising the objection of no
right of action. The Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, issued
supervisory writs to consider the validity of this ruling of the
trial court, among others. After argument, these writs were
recalled and the appellate court held that there was no authority
for compelling an adverse party who was a nonresident to ap49
pear for cross-examination in open court.
45. LA. R.S. 22:757 through 22:763 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1958,
No. 125.
46. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 930 and 931 (1960).
47. Id. art. 1634.
48. 146 So. 2d 689 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
49. The Supreme Court subsequently issued a writ of certiorari to review
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The remaining four cases in this area involved res judicata.
In one,5° the intermediate appellate court reversed the judgment
of the trial court sustaining the peremptory exception pleading
this objection. The first suit, which was pleaded in bar, was an
action by the plaintiff small loan company against its former
manager to recover on his oral promise to pay the amount of a
loan which he had approved if the borrower did not. The second suit, between the same parties, was one for an accounting
because of the defendant's alleged breach of his fiduciary relationship in making the same loan. The majority of the appellate
court held that the causes of action in the two suits were different, hence the judgment in the first suit did not bar the second
action.
The result reached by the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, in
52
51
Bowman v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. seems to be the correct one.
However, the reasons which it assigned for its judgment against
one of the plaintiffs clashes with fundamental legal theory and
is quite apt to cause damage in the future. In Bowman, the appellate court held that the judgment of a federal district court
rejecting the wife's demand against the employer for damages
caused by its employee's negligence was res judicata of her demand against the employee in the second suit. This holding violates the cardinal requirement of res judicata in civilian jurisdictions that the two suits be between the same parties.5 3 Res
judicata would not apply in such a situation even in AngloAmerican jurisdictions, although the second action would have
54
been barred by its companion doctrine, estoppel by judgment.
Bowman appears to be the exact opposite of McKnight v.
State,55 an earlier case decided by the same intermediate appelanother ruling in the case made by the intermediate appellate court, Cattle Farms,

Inc. v. Abercrombie, 243 La. 1013, 149 So. 2d 766 (1963) ; and subsequently
reversed the court of appeal on the point thus reviewed. Id., 244 La. 969, 155
So. 2d 426 (1963). This latter decision is discussed in "Real Actions," infra.
50. Pacific Finance Co. of Caddo v. Benson, 149 So. 2d 239 (La. App. 2d

Cir. 1963), with Hardy, Presiding Judge, dissenting.
51. 149 So. 2d 723 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
52. Since the court of appeal rejected the children's claim for damages on
the ground that the sole proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of

their father.
53. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2286 (1870).
54. The difference between res judicata and estoppel by judgment in AngloAmerican law is discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
Procedure, 16 LA. L. REV. 361, 366-68 (1956). See also
1954-1955 Term -Civil
Comment, Res Judicata- "Matters Which Might Have Been Pleaded," 2 LA.

L. REV. 347, 348-53 (1940).
55. 68 So. 2d 652 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953), noted 15 LA. L. REV. 901 (1954).
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late court. There, the judgment rejecting a wife's claim against
a highway policeman for damages for the wrongful death of her
husband allegedly through the policeman's negligence was held
res judicata of her subsequent action against the state to recover
damages for wrongful death of her husband on the same
grounds. This holding was likewise improper, since the defendants in Mrs. McKnight's two suits were different. However, the
dismissal of Mrs. McKnight's second suit was proper. The judgment rejecting her demand against the highway policeman would
have deprived the state, had it been cast in, the second suit, of
obtaining indemnity from its negligent employee. 56 In Bowman,
the situation is reversed- the employee has no right to obtain
indemnity from his employer, and hence was not prejudiced by
the judgment in favor of the employer.
Compromises "have, between the interested parties, a force
equal to the authority of things adjudged." 5T Probably because
of this language, the decisions of the Louisiana courts prior to
the adoption of the new procedural code permitted a defendant
to plead a compromise through the exception of res judicata.5
No provision of the Code of Civil Procedure precludes any continuance of this practice, so it was held in Bowden v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.5 9 that a defendant may now plead
compromise through the peremptory exception urging the objection of res judicata.
It was the settled jurisprudence for years that plaintiff may
not collaterally attack a compromise pleaded by the defendant,
but must bring a direct action to annul it. 6o This jurisprudence
was not called to the attention of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, in McNabb v. Foodtown, Inc.,6' where the decision of the
trial court refusing to permit a collateral attack on the com56. See Note, 15 LA. L. REV. 901 (1954).
57. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3078 (1870).
58. Blades v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 237 La. 1, 110 So. 2d
116 (1959) ; Tooke v. Houston Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 122 So. 2d 109 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1960); Blades v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 95 So. 2d 209
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1957); Jackson v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
199 So. 419 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1940). See also Moak v. American Automobile
Ins. Co., 242 La. 160, 134 So. 2d 911 (1961).
59. 150 So. 2d 655 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963). See also Long v. Globe Indemnity Co., 144 So. 2d 275 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
60. Succession of Rousse, 144 La. 143, 80 So. 229 (1918) and case cited
therein; Tschirge v. Land-O-Lakes Developers, 98 So. 2d 270 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1957) ; Wholesale Distributing Co. v. Warren, 84 So. 2d 250 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1955). See also Benson v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. of New York, 79 So. 2d 345
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1955).
61. 143 So. 2d 144 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
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promise was reversed; and the appellate court held that, since.
replicatory pleadings are prohibited, the plaintiff may collaterally attack a compromise pleaded through the peremptory exception. The appellate court could have given effect to the prior
jurisprudence, and yet have attained the ends of justice, by reversing the case to permit plaintiff to amend his petition so as
to also seek the nullity of the compromise, as it did in Hampton
62
v. B. M. McNabb Contractor,Inc.
Motion for Summary Judgment
This procedural device has been needed in Louisiana so badly
and for such a long time that, after it was made available by the
new procedural code, 5 a professional temptation to use it could
no more be resisted than could the irresistible impulse of a child
to play with a new Christmas toy. Perhaps this accounts for the
very high proportion of summary judgments reversed by the ap4
pellate courts during the past term, with reversals in ten cases6
5
and affirmances in but three., Now that the appellate courts
have made it quite clear that this "Sudden Death" playoff is not
to be used except in cases where clearly there are no genuine
issues of fact, this device may be used more sparingly in the future. No useful purpose would be served by discussing all of
these cases, as the decision in the great majority of them turns
on the particular facts involved.
Villavasso v. Lincoln Beach Corp 66 presented some interesting questions with respect to the use of the motion for summary
62. 143 So. 2d 130 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962). See also Moak v. American
Automobile Ins. Co., 242 La. 160, 134 So. 2d 911 (1961).
63. By LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 965, and 966-969 (1960).
64. Walmsley v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 144 So. 2d 627 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1962) ; Villavasso v. Lincoln Beach Corp., 146 So. 2d 7 (La. App. 4th

Cir. 1962) ; Touchet v. Firemen's Ins. Co. of Newark, N. J., 146 So. 2d 441 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1962); McDonald v. Grande Corp., 148 So. 2d 441 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1962) ; Haspel v. Treece, 150 So. 2d 120 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963); Ellis
v. Johnson Lumber Co., 150 So. 2d 838 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963) ; Vallier v.
Aetna Finance Co., 152 So. 2d 112 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963) ; Sachse Electric,
Inc. v. Graybar Electric Co., 152 So. 2d 304 (ILa. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
In Eubanks v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 153 So. 2d 86 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1963), a summary judgment in favor of all three defendants was affirmed as to
one and reversed as to the other two. The summary judgment which was affirmed by the intermediate appellate court in Kay v. Carter, 142 So. 2d 836 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1962) was reversed by the Supreme Court under a writ of certiorari.

Id., 243 La. 1095, 150 So. 2d 27 (1963).
65. Farrell v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co., 143 So. 2d 100 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1962) ; Dowden v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 151 So. 2d 697 (La. App.

3d Cir. 1963) ; Townsend v. Peerless Ins. Co., 153 So. 2d 520 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1963).
66. 146 So. 2d 7 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
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judgment. There; after the jury had retired to reach its verdict,
counsel for one of the defendants orally moved for a summary
judgment, but requested the court to reserve its ruling until
after the jury had returned its verdict. The jury subsequently
disagreed, was unable to reach a verdict, and was discharged.
Counsel for the defendant then urged the court to grant his
prior oral motion for a summary judgment, but the court demurred. Eight days later counsel for the defendant filed an
ex parte written motion for a summary judgment, and the court
then dismissed the suit as to that defendant. On appeal, the
Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, properly reversed this summary judgment. The new procedural code requires that the motion for summary judgment be a written contradictory one and
7
that the adverse party be given at least ten days, notice of it.6
Further, on the new trial, plaintiff had the right to submit additional evidence to the second jury.6 8
Reconventional Demand
The new procedural code changes the law in this area in two
rather important respects in permitting the filing of exceptions69 and in requiring the filing of answers 70 to reconventional
demands. One of the two cases in this area decided by the appellate courts during the past term is an effective demonstration of the greater workability of the new code rules. 71 The
other, recognizing the necessity for the filing of an answer to a
reconventional demand, held that a reconvener waives an answer
thereto when he goes to trial without taking a preliminary de72
fault on the reconventional demand.
Third Party Demand
Three of the cases decided in this area during the past term
67. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 966 (1960).
68. Cf. id. arts. 1977 and 1978.
69. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1034 (1960).
70. Id. art. 1035.
71. Webb v. Hammond, 144 So. 2d 283 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962), where the
trial judge, applying the former procedural rule, sustained the objection of the
defendant in reconvention to the introduction of any evidence to support the
reconventional demand on the ground that it was vague. On appeal, under the
facts found by the majority of the court, the judgment was reversed, with Herget,J., dissenting.
72. National Co. v. Navarro, 149 So. 2d 648 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963). This
decision receives strong: analogical support from Ducote v. Ducote, 183 La. 886,.
165 So. 133 (1935) ; Lalumia v. Lalumia, 115 So. 2d 883, 885 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1959), and cases cited.
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were important, but possess transient significance only. 78 These
held that, although the accidents involved happened prior to the
effective date of the 1960 amendment of article 2103 of the Civil
Code,7 4 the defendants could enforce contribution between joint
tortfeasors through the third party demand in all suits filed
after the effective date of the code amendment.
Breaux v. Texas & Pacific Ry.7 5 appears to have prophetic
value in indicating the future use of the third party demand as
a device for the distribution of accidental losses among the parties legally responsible. There, the plaintiff tutor sued the defendant railway to recover damages for the wrongful death of
the minors' father in a grade crossing accident. The defendant
railway called in the plaintiff tutor as a third party defendant7 6
in the effort to enforce contribution against the estate of the
minors' deceased father, of which the minors had been put in
possession judicially under benefit of inventory. The trial court
sustained the plaintiff's exception and dismissed the third party
demand. In the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction the Court
of Appeal, First Circuit, partially reversed this judgment. While
recognizing that the minors were not personally liable for their
father's obligations, the appellate court held that the defendant
could call in the father's estate as a third party defendant,
through the tutor of the minors.
Emmons v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 77 decided by the Court of
Appeal, Fourth Circuit, had twin holdings of extreme importance to the, present subject. First, it held that a defendant
could not enforce contribution against a co-defendant unless the
latter was called in as a third party defendant. Second, it held
that when only one of two defendants is cast and only that de73. Lowery v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 146 So. 2d 231 (La.

App. 2d Cir. 1962) ; Lanier v. T. L. James & Co., 148 So. 2d 100 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1962) ; and Caruso v. Newark Ins. Co., 150 So. 2d 337 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1963).
The same result was reached during the prior term in Brown v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 136 So. 2d 283 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961), and id., 136 So. 2d 286
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1961), and both cases were affirmed by the Supreme Court
under certiorari. Id., 243 La. 271, 142 So. 2d 796 (1962).
74. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2103 (1870), as amended by La. Acts 1960, No. .30,

§ 1,

which went 'into effect on January 1, 1961.
75. 147 So. 2d 693 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
76. "Third party practice is one of the most effective improvements in the
administration of civil justice made in recent- years, but its use is not completely
free of difficulty. One of the minor irritants in the use of third party practice is
that a litigant sometimes meets himself coming back. Here is an illustration of
this :petty .difficulty."
MCMAHON & RUBiN, PLEADINGS IAND JUDICIAL FORMS
ANNOTATED, 10 LSA-CODE OF CIVIL PROCEmURE 429, note 3 (1963).

77. 150 So. 2d 94 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
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fendant appeals, his appeal does not bring up for review that
aspect of the judgment in favor of his co-defendant. Both holdings appear to the writer to be erroneous, and both are in conflict with the prior decision of Vidrine v. Simoneaux,78 decided
by the Third Circuit.
Long prior to the 1960 code amendment which permits a defendant to enforce contribution through the third party demand,
one of two defendants cast solidarily had the right to enforce
contribution against the other.7 9 The purpose of this code
amendment was to broaden, rather than restrict, the substantive
right to enforce contribution between tortfeasors. The appellate
court pitched its holding on the language of the code amendment "whether or not the third party defendant was sued by the
plaintiff initially" ;80 but the court missed the purpose of this
language. It was not intended to require a defendant to call his
co-defendant as a third party defendant in order to enforce contribution, but rather to permit him to protect himself against
the danger of the plaintiff discontinuing the suit against the codefendant prior to judgment.
DEPOSITIONS AND DIscoVERY
One of the chronic complaints of news media throughout the
country is that its reporters are not protected by any privilege
and may be compelled legally to disclose their confidential
sources of information. This issue was presented in Louisiana
for the first time in Miller, Smith & Champagne v. Capital City
Press.81 This was an action to recover damages for an allegedly
libelous article published by the defendant. For discovery purposes, the plaintiff took the deposition of the reporter who had
written the article; and during the taking of the deposition the
reporter was asked to disclose the identity of the "absolutely
reliable source" of the information on which the article was
based. The reporter refused to answer this question, and in due
course was ordered by the trial court to do so. Defendant then
applied to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, for supervisory
writs to set aside this order. After the issuance of alternative
78. 145 So. 2d 400 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
79. Quatray v. Wicker, 178 La. 289, 151 So. 208 (1933), noted 9 TUL. L.
REv. 125 (1934) ; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. DeJean, 185 La. 1074, 171 So. 450
(1936), noted 1 LA. L. REv. 235 (1938).
80. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2103 (1870), as amended by La. Acts 1960, No. 30,

§ 1.

81. 142 So. 2d 462 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
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writs, the submission of the entire record, and argument of counsel, the appellate court recalled its writs. Plaintiff was held entitled to this information for discovery purposes. The Supreme
Court refused to review the decision of the intermediate appellate court.
Under the new procedural code, a trial court cannot compel
the production or inspection of any part of a writing prepared
by an expert for use at the trial which reflects his mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or theories. 82 Despite this prohibition, the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, held in State v. Riverside Realty Co.,8 an expropriation case, that the deposition of
the state's expert realtor could be taken by the defendant for
discovery purposes; and that this expert would be required to
answer all questions of fact regarding his appraisal of the property, and the method and manner used in making his appraisal.
The fact that he had to refer to written memoranda which he
had prepared to answer these questions did not preclude the
plaintiff's right to such information for discovery purposes.
This case followed a Supreme Court decision of the prior term."
Both appear to be completely sound.
The discovery devices could easily become instruments of
oppression and injustice were it not for the very effective controls made available to the courts to prevent imposition and
abuse.8 5 Dawson v. Lindley,s ( a medical malpractice suit, illustrates the effective use of these controls. There, an able and conscientious trial judge relieved the defendant physician of the
necessity of answering five of forty-seven interrogatories propounded by plaintiffs; relieved the defendant pharmaceutical
manufactruer of the necessity of answering ninety-eight of one
hundred and two interrogatories; and further narrowed the
breadth and generality of the remaining four interrogatories
propounded to the latter defendant. Plaintiffs invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, to
coerce the trial court into requiring answers to all interrogatories propounded by them. After argument, the appellate court
recalled its alternative writs, and affirmed the action of the trial
court limiting and restricting these interrogatories. The facts
82. LA. CODE OF CIVM PROCEDURE art. 1452 (1960).
83. 152 So. 2d 345 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
84. State v. Spruell, 243 La. 202, 142 So. 2d 396 (1962), noted 23 LA. L. REV.
595 (1963).
85. LA. CODE OF Cwrm PaRocwuR arts. 1452, 1454, 1473, 1491, and 1496
(1960).
86. 143 So. 2d 150 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
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of the case are too involved, the plaintiffs' interrogatories too
numerous, and the objections of the defendants too varied, to be
capsuled into the limited space available. It suffices to say, for
present purposes, that all convincingly support the view of both,
courts that most of these numerous interrogatories constituted
an abuse of the plaintiffs' privilege to compel discovery. This
decision should have a wholesome effect on the future use of the
discovery devices, serving as a caveat of the intention of the
courts to utilize these controls whenever necessary to prevent
oppression.
7
The Court of Appeal, First Circuit, held in Voisin v. Luke
that the pendency of exceptions does not relieve a defendant of
the necessity of answering timely the plaintiff's request for the
admission of facts. The only way in which such a request can
be suspended was held to be that provided by the pertinent code
article -

by written objection."
APPEALS

Generally
In justice to the appellate court which decided La Fleur v.
Dupuis, 9 it should be pointed out that this decision is based.
squarely on a prior appellate decision.90 If these two decisions
were sound, this writer would recommend an immediate amendment of the new procedural code to overturn them legislatively,
as they are so technical as to be completely unworkable. Their
invalidity, however, can be demonstrated readily. In Dupuis,
the trial court sustained defendant's dilatory exception pleading
the vagueness and generality of the petition, and ordered plaintiff to amend his petition. Plaintiff declined to do so, so the trial
court rendered judgment dismissing the suit. Plaintiff appealed
from this judgment, and on appeal challenged the validity of the
trial court's order to amend. The appellate court refused to consider this point, holding that the appeal did not bring up for review the interlocutory order requiring amendment. In both of
these decisions, the appellate courts overlooked the rationale of
the procedural rule applied. The reason for the prohibition
against an appeal from an interlocutory judgment which does
87. 151 So. 2d 99 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
88. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1496 (1960).
89. 147 So. 2d 724 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
90. Neal v. Hall, 28 So. 2d 131 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946).
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not cause irreparable injury is not to preclude any appellate review thereof, but rather to prohibit fragmentary appeals. An
interlocutory order which causes no irreparable injury is reviewable under the appeal taken from the final judgment in
the case."' The interlocutory order in Dupuis requiring amendment of the petition should have been reviewed under the appeal
from the final judgment dismissing the suit.
The Court of Appeal, First Circuit, overruled the motion to
dismiss the appeal in Voisin v. Luke,92 where the defendant appealed from an order of the trial court setting aside his answers
to plaintiff's request for admissions of facts on the ground that
they had not been filed timely. Since the effect of the trial
court's order was that the pertinent facts alleged in the plaintiff's petition were taken to be confessed, the motion to dismiss
was properly overruled. The able organ of the appellate court
wrote an excellent opinion which is open to only a single, narrow
bit of criticism. The twin classifications of judgments as final
and interlocutory and of the latter as those which cause irreparable injury and those which do not is complicated enough. In
Voisin the appellate court, following the leading case of Cary v.
Richardson9 3 decided by the Supreme Court eighty years ago,
recognized a third classification - one "which is assimilated in
character to a final judgment." In the Richardson case, this
third classification was necessary as the court was faced with a
code definition of final judgments as those which "decide all the
points in controversy between the parties. ' 94 This definition has
been broadened under the new procedural code: "A judgment
that determines the merits in whole or in part is a final judgment." 95 The line of demarcation between final and interlocutory
judgments, of necessity, will be quite shadowy in some cases.
Once a court has decided that the judgment appealed from
causes irreparable injury, it is not necessary for it to go further
and classify the judgment as being either final or interlocutory."
91. Succession of Carrire, 34 La. Ann. 1056 (1882) ; Marionneaux v. Marionneaux, 28 La. Ann. 392 (1876) ; Hodge's Heirs v. Durnford's Curator, 10 La.
497 (1837). See also Oliphint v. Oliphint, 219 La. 781, 810, 54 So. 2d 18, 28
(1951).
92. 142 So. 2d 815 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
93. 35 La. Ann. 505 (1883).

94.

LA. CODE OF PRACTICE

art. 539 (1870).

95. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1841 (1960).
96. Compare Succession of Lissa, 194 La. 328, 193 So. 663 (1940), where
the Supreme Court held that an ex parte judgment of possession in a succession
proceeding which failed to recognize one of the heirs caused irreparable injury,
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Because of the difficulties experienced in the past from the
commencement of delays from the rendition of judgment, in the
redaction of the Code of Civil Procedure the Law Institute eliminated all references thereto and had the delays for applying for
a new trial and appeal commence to run from either the signing,
97
or notice of the signing, of the judgment.
The Reporters on the Code of Civil Procedure Project were
thrown into quite a dither by the decision in C H F Finance Co.
v. Smith 8 by the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, which approved the ruling below that the delay for appealing from a
judgment of a city court runs from the rendition, rather than
from the signing, of the judgment. The attention of neither
court was called to the fact that such an interpretation of the
pertinent code provision99 not only conflicted with two other
code articles, 10 but actually made it possible for a party to lose
his right of appeal from a city court judgment before it ever accrued. 1 1 Fortunately, these points were noted by2 the Supreme
10
Court, which reversed the case under certiorari.
Copies of the new procedural code were commercially available prior to its effective date, January 1, 1961. Numerous articles about it have been published in legal periodicals, and the
three Reporters conducted a number of institutes throughout the
state to explain its procedural changes to members of the legal
profession. One change which had been repeatedly called to the
attention of the Bar was the reduction of the maximum delay
for taking a devolutive appeal from one year to ninety days. 10 3
In view of all this, it is both surprising and disillusioning to
note that during the new code's third year the devolutive appeals
but refused to characterize the judgment appealed from as being either final or
interlocutory.
97. Cf. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROcEDURE arts. 1911-1916, 1974, 2087, 2123
(1960). The necessity for this change is explained in the Preliminary Statement
of Chapter 3 of Title VI of Book II of the Code, and in Comment (a) under
Article 1911.
98. 146 So. 2d 196 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962). Eight different code articles
would have had to be amended to overrule this decision legislatively.
99. "An appeal from a judgment rendered by a city court can be taken only
within ten days from the date of judgment or of the service of notice of judgment
LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 4899
when necessary under Article 4898 .
(1960).
100. Id. arts. 4831, 4922.
101. Since an appeal cannot be taken from an unsigned judgment, if the judgment is signed more than ten days after rendition, the unsuccessful party would
have lost his right to appeal before it ever accrued.
102. C H F Finance Company v. Smith, 244 La. 180, 151 So. 2d 364 (1963).
103. By LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDUE art. 2087 (1960).

1964]

PROCEDURE

in eight cases 1 4 were dismissed because they had not been taken
timely. In a ninth case, 10 5 where the devolutive appeal was taken
more than nine and a half months after the signing of the judgment, the appellate court overruled the motion to dismiss. The
case had been taken under advisement prior to judgment, and
the record failed to show affirmatively that the clerk had mailed
to counsel notice of the signing of the judgment.
Procedurefor Appealing
Orleans Shoring Co. v. Verdun"' re-emphasized the importance of having a note of evidence taken on the confirmation of
a default judgment. Prior to appealing devolutively, counsel for
defendant unsuccessfully requested counsel for plaintiff to join
him in preparing a statement of facts; and then requested the
trial judge to prepare this statement. The trial judge was unable to comply with this request, as he did not remember the
evidence presented on the confirmation of the default judgment.
Under these circumstances, the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit,
properly reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a
trial de novo. The case was governed by the provisions of the
Code of Practice ;1o7 but its procedural rules are identical with
the pertinent provisions of the new code.' 0 8
The absence of a transcript of the evidence introduced at the
trial was the basis of the appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal in Succession of Seals. 0 9 The Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, overruled this motion, as the trial judge's Reasons for Judgment substantially covered all of this evidence and this was sufficient to permit the appellate court to review the issues of law
presented by the appeal. Though this decision of the intermediate appellate court was reversed in other respects under a writ
of certiorari,"0 the Supreme Court affirmed its overruling of
the motion to dismiss.
104. In Broussard v. Broussard, 143 So. 2d 595 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962)
Midwestern Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Miller, 143 So. 2d 757 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1962) ; Wulff v. Mayer, 144 So. 2d 246 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962); Rolston v.
Lafayette Concrete Pipe Co., 144 So. 2d 924 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962) ; Scott
v. Hunt Oil Co., 147 So. 2d 405 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962) ; Stevens v. Daigle &
Hinson Rambler, Inc., 148 So. 2d 105 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962); Spears v.
Fourmy, 150 So. 2d 342 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963) ; and Chambers v. Russell, 152
So. 2d 349 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
105. Wilson v. McNabb, 152 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
106. 144 So. 2d 474 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
107. LA. CODE OF PRACICE arts. 602, 603 (1870).
108. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2131 (1960).
109. 142 So. 2d 629 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
110. Succession of Seals, 243 La. 1056, 150 So. 2d 13 (1963).
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The appellee moved to dismiss the appeal in Portierv. Marquette Cas. Co.' on the ground that the record had not been
filed timely in the appellate court. To negative any presumption
that the delay was imputable to the clerk of the trial court, the
appellee showed some few days before the extended return date
this clerk had requested counsel for the appellant to send him
the filing fee of the appellate court, but that this request had not
been complied with until after the return date. The Court of
Appeal, Fourth Circuit, properly overruled the motion to dismiss, since appellant had an unexpended balance in its cost deposit with the clerk of the trial court in excess of the filing fee
of the appellate court.
Procedure in Appellate Court
The new procedural code provides that a motion to dismiss
an appeal because of any irregularity, error, or defect imputable
to the appellant must be filed within three days, exclusive of
holidays, of the return day or date on which the record is lodged
in the appellate court, whichever is later." 2 The appellee, in
Coastal Transmission Corp. v. LeJeune,"8 moved to dismiss the
appeal on the ground that the record had not been lodged in the
appellate court timely due to the failure of the appellant to pay
the filing fee of the appellate court, but that this request had not
tion to dismiss was filed more than a month after the record had
been filed in the appellate court, the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, overruled the motion because it had not been filed timely.
Prior to July 1, 1960, the fourteen-day delay for applying
for a rehearing ran from rendition of judgment in the Supreme
Court and Court of Appeal for the Parish of Orleans," 4 and
from the receipt of notice of the judgment in the Courts of Appeal, First and Second Circuits." 5 In an effort to provide uniformity of procedure the Judicial Council, in the 1958 appellate
reorganization, recommended the amendment of article III, § 24,
111. 146 So. 2d 48 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
112. LA. CODE OF Civin PROCEDURE art. 2161 (1960).
113. 144 So. 2d 759 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
114. LA. R.S. 13:4446 (1950).
115. As the result of the following language of LA. CONST. art. VII, § 24
(1921), applicable only to the Courts of Appeal, First and Second Circuits:
"Notice of all judgments shall be given to counsel of record; and the court shall
provide by rule for the giving of notices. No delay shall run until such notice has
been given." The last sentence was construed to mean, in Morning Star Baptist
Church v. Martina, 150 La. 951, 91 So. 404 (1922) as "No delay shall run until
such notice has been received."
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of the Constitution, of R.S. 13:4446, and the conformity of language in the new procedural code, which was then being completed." 6 All of this was done to require all of the intermediate
appellate courts to give notice of rendition of judgment and to
have the delay for applying for a rehearing from this date.
This was expressly spelled out in the new rules of the reorganized intermediate appellate courts. 117 After July 1, 1960, when
the amendments recommended by the Judicial Council became
effective, all of the intermediate appellate courts refused to consider applications for rehearing filed more than fourteen days
after the date notice of judgment had been mailed by their
clerks.""
In Wanless v. Louisiana Real Estate Board"9 the Supreme
Court held that this rule of the intermediate appellate courts
conflicted with the code and statutory provisions adopted on the
recommendation of the Judicial Council, and were therefore invalid. The phrase "notice of judgment has been given to counsel" was interpreted to mean "notice of judgment has been given
to and received by counsel." This decision was followed by the
Supreme Court in subsequent cases. 20 As a result, the intermediate appellate courts were forced to amend the rule' 21 to conform to these Supreme Court decisions.
The writer cannot help but question the correctness of the
Wanless decision; but regardless of this, there can be no doubt
of the unfortunate procedural effects which it produced, in depriving the legal profession of a desirable uniformity of procedure, and forcing on the intermediate appellate courts a rule
which is sometimes extremely difficult to administer. 122
116. The language recommended by the Judicial Council was conformed to in
art. 2166 (1960).
117. Rule XI, Uniform Rules of the Louisiana Courts of Appeal (1960).
118. Wanless v. Louisiana Real Estate Board, 140 So. 2d 429 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1962) ; United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Town of Washington, 143 So. 2d 613
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) and cases cited; Jefferson v. Jefferson, 145 So. 2d 356
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) ; Moreau v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.,
146 So. 2d 692 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) ; Funderburk v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 146 So. 2d 710 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) ; State v. Lumpkin, 147 So. 2d 80
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1962) ; Jones v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.,
148 So. 2d 309 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963) ; In re Henry, 148 So. 2d 313 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1963) ; Nipper v. Ferguson, 148 So. 2d 316 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
119. 243 La. 801, 147 So. 2d 395 (1962), noted 23 LA. L. REV. 589 (1963).
120. Jefferson v. Jefferson, 244 La. 493, 153 So. 2d 368 (1963) and State v.
Lumpkin, 244 La. 510, 153 So. 2d 374 (1963).
121. See Rule XI, Uniform Rules of the Louisiana Courts of Appeal (1963).
122. An intermediate appellate court cannot determine, when it receives a return receipt of the letter containing the judgment which is not signed by counsel
LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
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GARNISHMENT UNDER FIERI FACIAS

Three cases of interest in this area were decided by the appellate courts during the past term.
12
The defendant in League Central Credit Union v. Warman 3
was adjudicated a bankrupt after the filing of the suit, and subsequent to the confirmation of a default judgment received his
discharge in bankruptcy. When plaintiff sought to execute this
judgment by garnishment of the judgment debtor's salary, defendant instituted suit to declare the judgment a fraudulent
nullity and sought injunctive relief against its enforcement and
to prevent his employer from honoring the garnishment. The
trial court issued a preliminary injunction as prayed for, and
from this the plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeal, Fourth
Circuit, affirmed. The only point raised by plaintiff which had
any merit whatever was that the citation in the nullity action
was not served on plaintiff, but rather on his counsel of record
in the original suit. The appellate court swept this aside, taking
the position that the nullity action was an incident of the original suit. 124 The local rules of the trial court in this case com125
pletely justified this position of the appellate court.

The plaintiff, in Blue Bonnet Creamery, Inc. v. Simon, 26 obtained a default judgment for nine odd thousand dollars on
worthless checks issued by defendant for goods and merchandise, and for an additional odd thousand dollars on an open account for cartons and containers furnished defendant. Subsequently, the plaintiff garnished the salary of the judgment debtor in a proceeding brought at the domicile of the garnishee.
Thereafter, the judgment debtor was adjudicated a bankrupt,
and in the bankruptcy proceeding the Referee ordered the judgment creditor to show cause why the garnishment proceeding
should not be dissolved. By agreement of counsel, the garnishof record, whether the person who signed the receipt was employed by counsel,
and if not when and whether counsel ever received the judgment.
123. 143 So. 2d 241 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
124. As in the case of the injunction proceeding to arrest the seizure and
sale in an executory proceeding. Cf. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2752

(1960).
125. "Suits or proceedings not in their nature original, but growing out of
suits or proceedings previously pending, such as actions of nullity of judgments,

or to restrain or regulate the execution of process, mesne or final, in suits previously pending, shall not be docketed as separate suits, but shall be treated as
parts of the original suits out of which they arise. . . ." Rule VIII, § 9, of the
Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans (1954).
See also LA. CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2006 (1960).
126. 136 So. 2d 443 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
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ment was continued in effect and the issue of the release of the
judgment by the discharge in bankruptcy was left to the decision
of the state court in the garnishment proceeding. In the latter,
the trial judge held that the bankruptcy discharge barred the
enforcement of that portion of the judgment for cartons and
containers, but did not render invalid that part of the judgment
for the worthless checks. On appeal, the Court of Appeal, First
Circuit, reversed, holding that the continued acceptance by the
plaintiff of these worthless checks indicated a credit arrangement, rather than the obtaining of goods through false representations by the bankrupt. 127 Under certiorari, the Supreme
Court reversed the decision of the intermediate appeal court and
remanded the garnishment proceedings to the trial court,128 on
the ground that the evidence introduced was not sufficient to
either prove or disprove the dischargeability of the debt represented by the worthless checks.
In Southern Scrap Mat. Co. v. Commercial Scrap Mat.
Corp., 29 plaintiff garnished the president of the defendant cor-

poration in the execution of its judgment against the latter. The
garnishee answered, denying any indebtedness to defendant. On
the traverse of the answers to the garnishment interrogatories,
the trial judge concluded that the garnishee and his witnesses
were unworthy of belief and rendered judgment against the
garnishee for the full amount of the judgment. The Court of
Appeal, Fourth Circuit, reduced this judgment against the garnishee to the amount of his indebtedness to defendant definitely
established by the evidence. The fact that the garnishee's witnesses were unworthy of belief was properly held not to justify
the rendition of a judgment against him for the full amount of
the judgment against the defendant. 13
EXECUTORY PROCEEDINGS

Allen v. Commercial National Bank in Shreveport"' was an
action to annul the judicial sale of three properties and to enjoin
interference by the adjudicatee with the plaintiff's possession
of them. Originally, to secure a loan of some $28,000, plaintiff
127. Blue Bonnet Creamery, Inc. v. Gulf Milk Ass'n, 136 So. 2d 445 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1961).

128.
(1962).
129.
130.
(1960).
131.

Blue Bonnet Creamery, Inc. v. Simon, 243 La. 683, 146 So. 2d 162
144 So. 2d 425 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
This accords with the rule of LA. CODE
138 So. 2d 252 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).

OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
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had pledged to the defendant three mortgage notes which he had
executed, aggregating some $52,000, each secured by a mortgage
on a different property. When this loan was not paid at maturity, the bank sought to enforce each of the three mortgages
in a separate executory proceeding, for the full amount of the
mortgage notes. The proper demand for payment was made, the
proper writ issued, the proper notice of seizure was served, and
the proper judicial advertisement of the sale was made in each
case. Then plaintiff had the three proceedings consolidated and
brought an injunction proceeding to reduce the total amount
claimed by the bank to the $28,000 due on the loan. After the
trial of the rule for a preliminary injunction, the trial court rendered an order reducing the amount due to the $28,000, ordering the three properties to be sold together and otherwise as advertised. The bank bought the properties in at the judical sale,
and the present suit followed, in which plaintiff sought to annul
the judiical sale on the grounds that there had been no demand
for payment of the real indebtedness, no notice of seizure of the
three properties together, and no advertisement of the sale of
the three properties together. The bank's exception of no cause
of action was sustained by the trial court, and this judgment
was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit. The latter held that the action was actually a collateral attack on the
trial court's judgment on the rule for a preliminary injunction,
which the present plaintiff had not attempted to modify by appeal or by supervisory writs. Under certiorari, the Supreme
Court affirmed both the decision and the reasons assigned by
132
the intermediate appellate court.
In seven cases between the same parties'"3 plaintiff sought
to recover deficiency judgments under seven different chattel
mortgages. The facts occurred during the regime of the Code of
Practice, under which an executory proceeding to enforce a
chattel mortgage might have been brought either in the parish
of the mortgagor's domicile or in the parish where the motor
vehicle affected by the mortgage was situated.8 4 These executory proceedings were brought in Orleans Parish, where neither
of the mortgagors were domiciled and where none of the mort132. Id., 243 La. 840, 147 So. 2d 865 (1963).
133. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Dixon, 142 So. 2d 605 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962)
id., 142 So. 2d 609 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) ; id., 142 So. 2d 610 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1962) ; id., 142 So. 2d 611 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962); id., 142 So. 2d 612
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
134. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE arts. 162, 736 (1870).
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gaged vehicles were situated. After appraisement, the vehicles
were sold by the sheriffs of the parishes where they were situated, under writs of seizure and sale issued by the Orleans Parish court. Thereafter, the present suits were brought at the
domicile of the mortgagors to recover the deficiency judgments.
These suits were dismissed by the trial court, which sustained
the defendants' exceptions of no cause of action, and the Court
of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, affirmed. The appellate court held
that the executory proceedings were absolute nullities as the
court in which they were conducted were not competent; and
that since there had been no lawful appraisement of the vehicles,
plaintiff was barred from recovering deficiency judgments.
Though the appellate court's decision was valid under the
prior jurisprudence, which had scrambled and confused the rules
of jurisdiction ratione materiae et personae,135 it is believed that
the result would be different under the rules of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which has carefully distinguished the rules governing jurisdiction from those regulating venue. 1 8 If the defendant in an executory proceeding does not now object to the improper venue 13 7 by a suspensive appeal or an injunction proceeding to arrest the seizure and sale, the executory proceeding
brought in an improper venue would be valid. 138
PROBATE PROCEDURE

By the unconditional acceptance of a succession the heir
binds himself personally for the payment of his proportionate
part of the obligations of the deceased.13 9 For this reason, the
law required that in order to accept a succession unconditionally
the heir "must be capable of contracting obligations.' 140 Further,
since the unconditional acceptance of a succession by a competent heir will or may subject him to liability for the deceased's
obligations, for more than a century and a third Louisiana law
has consistently required the unconditional acceptance of a suc135. On this point, see LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Introduction to Title I

of Book I (1960) ; and Jurisdiction Under the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure,
35 TUL. L. REV. 501, 502, 503 (1961).
136. Ibid. See also LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDuRE arts. 1-10, 41-45, 71-83
(1960).
137. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2633 (1960).
138. Under LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 44, 2642, 2751 (1960).
139. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1013 (1870).
140. Id. art. 1004. Minor heirs must always be considered as having accepted
the succession with benefit of inventory. Id. art. 977. Cf. LA. CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDuRE art. 3004, as amended by La. Acts 1961, No. 23, § 1.
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cession to be by all competent heirs; and, if for any reason, one
refuses to do so there must be an administration of the succession.14 ' There is one isolated and unfortunate decision by the
Supreme Court which held that when the succession was relatively free of debt, none of the creditors were demanding an administration, and the majority of the heirs accepted it uncondiinto possession, even though one
tionally, all heirs would be sent
142
demanded an administration.
Possibly because of this case, a custom had developed in some
parts of the state of having all heirs sent into possession when
the majority accepted unconditionally and alleged that the succession was relatively free of debt, even though one or more demanded an administration. To make the probate procedure of
Louisiana uniform, as well as to avert the potential danger to a
dissenting heir posed by this custom, the new procedural code
specifically provides that all competent heirs or residuary legatees must accept the succession unconditionally, in order to dispense with its administration. 43 These code provisions were applied in two cases decided during the past term. 4 4 In both, the
intermediate appellate courts refused to order that all heirs or
legatees be sent into possession without an administration, when
one demanded it.
REAL ACTIONS AND "FRINGE" ACTIONS
The cumulation of the possessory and petitory actions in the
same suit, even in the alternative, would so royally foul up the
procedure of both that it was forbidden by the Code of Practice, 4 5 and is even more emphatically prohibited by the new procedural code. 46 Prior to 1961, such a cumulation resulted in a
judicial confession of the possession of the defendant even as to
subsequent suits; but this has been relaxed slightly by the new
141. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1040 (1825) ; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1047 (1870).
142. Succession of Weincke, 118 La. 206, 42 So. 776 (1907). The opinion
cites LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1047 (1870) but takes the position that it is "controlled" by LA. CODE OF PRACTICE arts. 975 et 8eq. (1870). Not only were
these provisions of the two codes not in conflict, but they related to different
subjects. The Civil Code provision requires an administration whenever one of
the heirs demands it; while the Code of Practice articles required the administration whenever one of the creditors demanded it.
143. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 3001, 3004, 3031 (1960).
144. Succession of Browne, 142 So. 2d 494 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962) ; Succession of Houssiere, 146 So. 2d 483 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962), certiorari denied by
the Supreme Court.
145. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 54 (1870).
146. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3657 (1960). See also id., arts.
462, 463.
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code so as to constitute such a confession only in that suit, and
does not prevent its dismissal and the subsequent renewal of the
147
possessory action.
In Coleman's Heirs v. Holmes' Heirs,1
48
plaintiffs first instituted a petitory action, praying to be adjudged the owners of
the property; and then filed a supplemental petition which alleged plaintiffs' possession but expressly retained the prayer of
the original petition. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a second supplemental petition which did not delete any of their prior allegations but added new ones alleging plaintiffs' ownership and
possession, and prayed that plaintiffs' possession be recognized
and defendants ordered to assert their pretensions of ownership.
Defendants then excepted on the ground that plaintiffs had not
stated any right or cause of action, and this exception was sustained by the trial judge. On appeal this judgment was reversed.
The Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, held that since plaintiffs
did not, in their second supplemental petition, retain their original prayer to be adjudged owners, but on the contrary prayed
for recognition of their possession, the petitory action originally
brought must be deemed to have been abandoned, and there was
no longer any objection to a continuation of the suit as a possessory action.
The difference between this position of the appellate court
and the dismissal of the action and subsequent institution of the
possessory action is admittedly but a short step, which may not
do any damage in the instant case. However, the writer chafes
at his own limited imagination which prevents him from visualizing the difficulties which his own intuitive judgment assures
him will inevitably result from any future projection of this
decision.
Three related cases decided during the past term, which were
instituted and tried prior to the effective date of the new code,
concern the application of the lis pendens statute permitting the
filing of notice of the pendency of a suit affecting the title to
immovable property in the mortgage records of the parish where
the property is situated.140 Plaintiff sued in Orleans Parish for
an accounting, alleging the creation of a partnership by oral
agreement to acquire mineral leases and other rights in the name
147. See id. art. 3657, Comment (c).
148. 147 So. 2d 752 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
149. LA. R.S. 13:3541 through 13:3543 (1950).
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of defendant, and that defendant fraudulently concealed from
plaintiff his acquisition during the existence of this partnership
of valuable mineral interests in property in Plaquemines Parish.
Plaintiff recorded notice of the pendency of the Orleans accounting suit in Plaquemines Parish, where these immovables
were situated. Defendant filed various exceptions to the accounting suit and ruled plaintiff into court to show cause why
the notice of lis pendens should not be cancelled. The Orleans
parish court overruled these exceptions and dismissed this rule.
From the latter judgment plaintiff appealed, and the Court of
Appeal, Fourth Circuit, affirmed. 150
Following the dismissal of his rule by the Orleans court, defendant instituted suit in Plaquemines Parish to mandamus the
clerk of court and the plaintiff in the accounting suit to cancel
the inscription of the lis pendens. From the judgment of the
Plaquemines court making the mandamus peremptory and ordering cancellation of the lis pendens, defendant (plaintiff in
the accounting suit) appealed. The Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, reversed, holding that under the law applicable at the time
these two suits were filed, the accounting suit did affect the title
to immovables and the notice of lis pendens was properly filed. 51 1
Under certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of
the intermediate appellate court. 52 The Supreme Court held
that since the accounting suit alleged an oral partnership agreement and concealment by the defendant which negated any intention on his part to deliver title, and since the title to mineral
interests could not be proven by parol, notice of the lis pendens
was properly cancelled by the Plaquemines court. The writer
believes that this latter decision is the sounder of the two appellate court opinions.
In Cattle Farms, Inc. v. Abercrombie,"5" a case governed by
the procedural rules in effect prior to the new code, the Supreme
Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, 5 4 with respect to the function of the exception of no right
of action in actions to determine ownership of immovables. The
intermediate appellate court had affirmed the judgment appealed from, which sustained this exception after evidence had
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
decision

Pique v. Ingolia, 144 So. 2d 638 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
Ingolia v. Lobrano, 144 So. 2d 634 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
Id., 244 La. 241, 152 So. 2d 7 (1963).
244 La. 969, 155 So. 2d 426 (1963).
Id., 146 So. 2d 689 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962). Another point in this
is discussed supra, page 302.
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been introduced on its trial to refute plaintiffs' alleged ownership of the property. The Supreme Court recognized that generally evidence may be introduced on the trial of the exception
of no right of action, but it affirmed its prior holdings that this
rule does not obtain when the exception is employed to dispose
of the very issue which would be presented on the trial of the
case on its merits. The writer heretofore has had occasion to
approve of this sound rule of judicial administration, which is
necessary to avoid dual lengthy trials of the same complicated
factual issues. 15 Nothing in the new code changes this rule, 156
except that instead of the exception being overruled as it was in
157
the instant case, it may have to be referred to the merits.
In the writer's opinion, Walmsley v. Pan American Petroleum Corp.158 is one of the most far-reaching cases decided during the past term. There, the Supreme Court held that an action
to remove a cloud from title is not precluded by defendant's possession of the immovables in controversy. The case is discussed
elsewhere in this Symposium, 1 9 so as to avoid repetition it will
not be considered again here. However, the writer wishes to
record his concurrence in the views there expressed by Professor
Hardy.
CONCURSUS PROCEEDINGS

The two cases in this area decided during the past term, 60
both arising from the same facts, are interesting but settled no
particularly difficult problem. The common source of both was
the death of four persons and the serious injury of a fifth in an
automobile accident. The injured person and the survivors of
the deceased person filed separate suits to recover damages
against the owner of the truck, his insurers, the operator of
the truck, and several corporations. The truck owner's insurers,
primary and excess liability, in separate proceedings each de155. See the discussion of Wischer v. Madison Realty Co., 231 La. 704, 92
So. 2d 589 (1956) in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 19561957 Term-Civil Procedure, 18 LA. L. REV. 103, 109 (1957).
156. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 931 (1960) is merely declaratory of

the general rule established by prior jurisprudence, and should not be construed
as precluding application of the rule of the instant case. Cf. id. art. 929 and
Comment (b) thereunder.
157. Under LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 929 (1960) and Comment (b)
thereunder.
158. 244 La. 513, 153 So. 2d 375 (1963), reversing id., 144 So.2d 627 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1962).
159. Supra p. 229 et seq.
160. Canal Ins. Co. v. Wascom, 148 So. 2d 89 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Wascom, 149 So. 2d 11 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
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posited into the registry of the court the full amount of its
liability coverage with accrued interest, impleaded all of the
plaintiffs in the damage suits, prayed for a judgment declaring
that the amount deposited was the limit of its liability to the
parties impleaded, and sought injunctive relief to prohibit the
impleaded parties from continuing the prosecution of their suits
against it. The trial court granted each insurer the relief it
prayed for, but in its judgments recognized the insurers' further obligations to provide a defense for the insured and to pay
all courts costs assessed against him.
The defendants appealed these judgments, primarily because
of a fear that under the Marionneaux case' 61 they might have the
effect of releasing all of the other defendants in the damage
suits. The Court of Appeal, First Circuit, affirmed both judgments. It pointed out that all the Marionneaux case held was
that a compromise with an employee effected a complete release
of the employer, even though all rights against the latter were
reserved in the compromise agreement ;1 62 and very properly
held that in the instant cases the judgments in favor of the
insurers did not prejudice in any way the rights of the plaintiffs in the damage suits against all other defendants.
FORMA PAUPERIS CASES
The decisions of the past term which did the greatest amount
of damage to the new procedural code were those in State ex rel.
Clark v. Hillebrandt,165 Both held that, as a result of the adoption of the new code, a litigant in a forma pauperis case had
been deprived of his former right to the compulsory attendance
of witnesses at the trial without prepayment of their fees and
expense allowances. The majority of both appellate courts saw
in the failure of article 5185 of the Code of Civil Procedure
to retain expressly the word "witnesses" of its source provision
a clear legislative intent to withdraw this privilege from impoverished litigants. Presiding Judge Tate of the intermediate
appellate court (who had not participated in the original de161. Williams v. Marionneaux, 240 La. 713, 124 So. 2d 919 (1960), discussed
in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1960-1961 Term- -Civi
i
Procedure, 22 LA. L. REV. 370, 374 (1962).
162. Because it deprived the employer, who was only secondarily liable, of
his right to enforce indemnity against the employee, who was primarily liable.
In this connection, see the discussion of the somewhat analogous case of MeKnight v. State, supra p. 303.
163. 244 La. 742, 154 So. 2d 384 (1963), affirming, under certiorari, State
ex rel. Clark v. Hillebrandt, 146 So. 2d 718 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
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cision) dissented from the refusal of his court to grant a rehearing; and Mr. Justice Sanders dissented from the decision
of the Supreme Court. Both able dissents pointed to the official
comments of the redactors indicating that no change of the law
on this point was intended, and to other language in the new
code which showed a legislative intent to continue to accord
this privilege to impoverished litigants.
Previously in construing the former R.S. 13:4525, the Supreme Court had held that in forma pauperis cases the fees,
mileage, and expenses of witnesses had to be advanced by the
0 4
police jury of the parish where the case was to be tried.1
However, one change made in the new procedural code had the effect
of increasing this burden on the governing bodies of the various
parishes. Under the prior law, a witness could not be compelled
to testify personally in court if he lived out of the parish and
more than one hundred miles from the courthouse. 165 Under the
new code, any witness residing or employed in the state can be
compelled to testify personally in court in any parish. 166 This
change may possibly have been a factor in these decisions.
The original forma pauperis act was quite prolix; and because of this and its numerous amendments, it was replete with
redundancy and repetition. Some of this was eliminated in the
statutory revision of 1950; but further editorial work was necessary to integrate its provisions into the Code of Civil Procedure.
One of the editorial changes so made was the deletion of the
word "witnesses" which, in both the original act and its statutory revision, had been sandwiched in in the enumeration of
public officers, where it stuck out like a sore thumb.
The word "witnesses" was deleted by the code redactors on
the theory that it was definitely included in other language of
the pertinent articles. It is true that article 1353, enunciating
the general rule, provided that "no subpoena shall issue until
the party who wishes to subpoena the witness first deposits
with the clerk of court a sum of money sufficient to pay all fees
and expenses to which the witness is entitled by law." But the
special rule applicable to forma pauperis cases is couched in
broad and all-inclusive language in article 5181:
164.
165.
166.
No. 23,
No. 69,

Hartford v. Mobley, 233 La. 956, 98 So. 2d 250 (1957).
The former LA. R.S. 13:3661 (1950).
LA. CODE OF CrIviL PROCEDuRE art. 1352, as amended by La. Acts 1961,
§ 1. See also LA. R.S. 13:3671 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1962,
§ 1.
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"A person who is unable to pay the costs of court, because
of his poverty and lack of means, may prosecute or defend
a judicial proceeding . . . in any trial or appellate court
without paying the costs in advance, or as they accrue, or
furnishing security therefor." (Emphasis added.)
Article 5185 expressly provides that the party permitted
to litigate without the prepayment of costs is entitled to the
"issuance and service of subpoenas." It also expressly includes
certain services about which there otherwise might be some
doubt as to whether they would be included in "costs of court,"
such as the services of a notary or other public officer in issuing
certificates and certifying copies of notarial acts and public
records. But there can't be the slightest doubt that witness
fees and expense allowances are included in this term. Yet two
appellate courts of Louisiana saw in the deletion of the repetitious word "witnesses" a clear legislative intent to withdraw
from impoverished litigants their right to the free use of witnesses which they have enjoyed for a half-century. This is the
strict construction which courts usually reserve for criminal
statutes; and certainly not the liberal interpretationwhich the
16T
code itself calls for.
The rule of the Hillebrandt cases presents no particularly
acute problem, as its legislative reversal will be a simple matter.
The real threat posed by these decisions is a judicial attitude
which regards the deletion of a single word, or any editorial
change of language, as necessarily indicating a clear legislative
intent to change the law. This makes the task of legislative
revision both difficult and dangerous.
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In State v. Green' a defendant prosecuted for unlawful sale
of narcotics urged the ingenious argument, by a motion to quash
167. "The articles of this Code are to be construed liberally, and with due
regard for the fact that rules of procedure implement the substantive law, and
are not an end in themselves." LA. CODE oP' CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 5051 (1960).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 244 La. 80, 150 So. 2d 571 (1963).

